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THE COLORBLIND LOTTERY
Pauline T. Kim*
INTRODUCTION

In issuing its companion decisions Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v.
Bollinger, the Supreme Court has once again sent mixed messages
about affirmative action, upholding the use of race by Michigan Law
School, but striking down the University of Michigan's undergraduate
admissions policies.1 These cases resolve a growing split among the
courts of appeals by endorsing Justice Powell's view in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke that student body diversity can be a
compelling state interest justifying consideration of race.2 At the
same time, however, the Court retained the basic doctrinal structure it
has established for deciding equal protection cases. As laid out in
Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, the use of racial classifications by
any governmental actor is subject to strict scrutiny.' In order to
survive strict scrutiny, the racial classification "must serve a
compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to
further that interest." 4
Despite the apparent stability of this doctrinal structure, the
multiple opinions in Grutter and Gratz reveal deep divisions within
the Court about the legitimacy of race-conscious policies and the
meaning of equal protection. Although a majority of the Justices
clearly approved the use of race-at least in a limited, non-mechanical

* Professor, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis. My thanks to Chris
Bracey, Rick Banks, Mitu Gulati, Goodwin Liu, Stuart Banner, Nancy Staudt, Dan
Keating, Barbara Flagg, Laura Rosenbury, Susan Appleton, and Kathy Goldwasser
for reading and commenting on early drafts of this Essay.
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411
(2003).
2. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2338-41; Gratz, 123 S.Ct. at 2426-27. Prior to these
decisions, circuits were split over whether Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), that student body
diversity is a compelling state interest, was binding precedent. Compare Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that Justice Powell's opinion is not
binding) and Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1248-49 (11th
Cir. 2001) (same) with Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that Justice Powell's opinion is binding) and Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).
3. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
4. Id. at 235 (citation omitted).
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way-in the university admissions process,5 others complained that
"the majority cannot commit to the principle that racial classifications
are per se harmful."6 At the heart of this disagreement lies conflict
over the notion of colorblindness. Although suspicious of raceconscious decision-making, the majority evidences a willingness to
"'take "relevant differences" into account.' ' '7 As Justice O'Connor
put it, "context matters."8 For Justices Scalia and Thomas, however,
colorblindness is an absolute imperative, prohibiting race-conscious
decision-making in all but the most dire circumstances, such as when
necessary "to provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent
violence." 9
The advocacy groups backing the plaintiffs in Grutter and Gratz
share this absolutist notion of colorblindness. Sharply disagreeing
with the Court's decision that race-conscious government action is
sometimes permissible, these groups have vowed to continue their
fight to enshrine their notion of colorblindness into the law. Within
weeks of the Grutter decision, opponents of affirmative action
announced a new effort to pass ballot initiatives in Michigan and other
states to ban affirmative action by state agencies. ° Other advocacy
groups intend to pursue further litigation to pressure schools to move
in a race-neutral direction.1 1 Michael Greve, co-founder of the
organization that litigated the Michigan cases, once explained that
their goal is to "put the consideration of race beyond the reach of the
state."12 His rhetoric suggests that the use of race is so odious that any
other criteria is preferable, no matter how irrational or arbitrary. As
he explained, "We don't have a problem with any admissions system,
provided it doesn't use race as a factor, period .... These schools can
use a lottery
or run applicants around a track if they like, but they can't
13
use race."'

In Grutter, the Supreme Court actually considered, and quickly
dismissed, the suggestion that an admissions lottery offered a
5. Grutter,123 S. Ct. at 2338-47.
6. Id. at 2361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 2338 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2352 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10. See V. Dion Haynes, New Battle on Affirmative Action: Opponents Plan to
Seek Ban via Vote in Michigan, Chi. Trib., July 8, 2003, § 1, at 8; Rebecca Trounson &
Stuart Silverstein, Bid to Export Prop. 209, L.A. Times, July 8, 2003, at B1; Karen W.
Arenson, Ballot Measure Seen in Wake of Court Ruling, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2003, at
A17.
11. See June Kronholz et al., Race Matters: Court Preserves Affirmative Action,
Wall St. J., June 24, 2003, at Al; V. Dion Haynes, Bans On Use of Race Get New
Scrutiny, Chi. Trib., June 25, 2003, § 1, at 11; Trounson & Silverstein, supra note 10, at
B1.
12. Michael S. Greve, The Demise of Race-Based Admissions Policies, Chron. of
Higher Educ., Mar. 19, 1999, at B6.
13. David Segal, PuttingAffirmative Action on Trial, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1998, at
Al (emphasis added).
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reasonable race-blind alternative to Michigan Law School's raceconscious diversity policy. 4 However, other federal courts have
seriously suggested that a lottery is a preferable means of allocating
scarce educational and employment opportunities, rather than a
policy that includes consideration of race. In striking down Michigan
Law School's admissions policy as unconstitutional, the trial court in
Grutter faulted the law school for not seriously considering race-blind
alternatives, such as a lottery system, when selecting among qualified
applicants.' 5 More directly, a federal district court in Tuttle v.
Arlington County School Board ordered a popular alternative
elementary school to stop efforts to promote racial and ethnic
diversity, and to institute a double-blind random lottery to determine
future admissions. 6 And, in Taxman v. Board of Education, where a
school system faced the necessity of laying off a teacher, the Third
Circuit implicitly required the school board to use a lottery or some
other game of chance, rather than invoke its affirmative action plan. 7
These cases all reflect the underlying premise that a colorblind
lottery is inherently preferable to any selection process that considers
race. As the Supreme Court made clear in Grutter,this preference for
chance over race does not follow inevitably from existing law. It is,
however, the logical consequence of an insistence on formal
colorblindness.
If, as colorblindness proponents argue, any
consideration of race is inherently wrong, then nothing short of an
"emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb"'"
justifies race-conscious decision-making. Therefore, in the absence of
such exigent circumstances, those who insist on colorblindness must
prefer any alternative-including a lottery-to the use of race.
The Grutter Court took a step away from embracing formal
colorblindness as a deciding principle. Nevertheless, the current
structure of equal protection analysis, which the Court's decision in
Grutter left intact, lends particular weight to the notion of
colorblindness. The Court's three-tiered approach to equal protection
review singles out race-conscious decision-making as uniquely
problematic, warranting the most exacting scrutiny. 9 By treating race
as exceptional, the Court's jurisprudence suggests that any use of race
14. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2345.
15. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
16. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999). The district
court in Tuttle ordered the School Board to conduct a double-blind random lottery in
an unpublished memorandum opinion. Id. at 701. Although agreeing with the district
court's conclusion that the race-conscious policy was unconstitutional, the Fourth
Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded the case to permit the School Board to
consider other alternative admissions policies. Id. at 708.
17. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
18. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
19. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 638-44 (6th ed.
2000).
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is inherently wrong, regardless of the purpose, context, or effects of
the policy in question. Because legal doctrine shapes our discourse
and our understanding, "colorblindness" is sometimes invoked as a
self-evident good, an argument with talismanic force.
This Essay questions the assumed validity of "colorblindness"
arguments. It does so by scrutinizing those earlier decisions preferring
lotteries to affirmative action, as a way of unpacking the meaning of
"colorblindness."
Insistence that decision-making should be
colorblind is often motivated by basic notions of fairness; persons
should be judged according to their individual merit, not some
irrelevant, arbitrary criterion over which they have no control. Yet
deciding by lot does not necessarily promote these values any more
than does taking race into account. Lotteries might appear more
attractive than race-conscious processes because they offer neutrality
and equal treatment to all participants. However, as argued below,
these virtues are often more apparent than real. Lotteries seem
neutral because they rely on chance to select winners, but this focus
masks the substantive choices that determine who is, and who is not,
given a chance to participate.
In focusing solely on the choice between lotteries and raceconscious decision-making, this Essay does not mean to suggest that
opponents of affirmative action specifically advocate lotteries as the
preferred decision criterion in admissions or employment decisions.
Nor does it propose that a lottery is never a fair or appropriate way of
making decisions. In certain circumstances, an unbiased lottery may
well be a sensible way of allocating unavoidable burdens or of
distributing scarce resources. 2 0 This Essay does not attempt to
delineate what those circumstances might be. Rather, it uses the
concept of the lottery as a device to tease out what underlies the
insistence on formal colorblindness. More specifically, it questions the
claim that race-conscious decision-making is so inherently
problematic, regardless of the context of the decision or the manner in
which race is taken into account, that resorting to a lottery is always
preferable. Although a stark choice between race-conscious decisionmaking versus a game of chance may not often arise in practice, it is
worth exploring because of the light it sheds on the logic of
colorblindness.
I. PREFERRING LOTTERIES

After her rejection by the University of Michigan Law School (the
"Law School"), Barbara Grutter filed suit, alleging that the school's
admissions policies violate the Equal Protection Clause by taking race
20. For a systematic exploration of the possibilities and implications of deciding
by lot in a broad variety of contexts, including the legal context, see generally Neil
Duxbury, Random Justice: On Lotteries and Legal Decision-Making (1999).
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into account. The Law School argued that its use of race in the
admissions process was lawful because race is only one factor among
many, the school gives each application individualized review, and the
policy is necessary to achieve meaningful racial diversity. 1 Although
the Supreme Court eventually upheld the Law School's policy,
District Court Judge Bernard Friedman initially held it
unconstitutional.22 Of particular relevance here, Judge Friedman
faulted the law school for its apparent failure to consider race-blind
alternatives to affirmative action, such as "using a lottery system for
all qualified applicants. '23 On appeal, Sixth Circuit Judge Boggs,
dissenting from the majority opinion, repeated this argument,
asserting that a lottery "would insure a student body as diverse as the
'qualified' applicant pool itself. ' 24 For both these judges, a lottery to
allocate places in a law school class seems constitutionally preferable
to any consideration of race in the admissions process.
Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board25 did not involve highly
selective university admissions, but reviewed the policy for allocating
seats in an oversubscribed alternative elementary school. Because
applications for kindergarten at the popular Arlington Traditional
School (ATS) exceeded the number of available spaces, the Arlington
County School Board. (the "Arlington School Board") adopted a
policy intended to prepare students for "'a diverse, global society"'
and to "'serve the diverse groups of students in the district.' ''26 After
offering spots to applicants whose siblings already attended the
school, the Arlington School Board conducted a weighted lottery to
fill the remaining places in the kindergarten class. Weights were
assigned based on "low-income or special family background,"
whether English was a second language, and race or ethnicity, in order
to increase the probability of selecting children from certain
underrepresented groups. 27 Finding the policy unconstitutional, Judge
Bryan ordered the Arlington School Board to conduct a double-blind
random lottery instead.28 Like Judges Friedman and Boggs in Grutter,
Judge Bryan apparently believed that a random lottery was
constitutionally preferable to any race-conscious efforts to promote
21. See Brief for Respondents at 3-5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003)
(No. 02-241).
22. Judge Friedman concluded that a university's desire to assemble a racially
diverse student body is not a compelling state interest, and that, therefore, Michigan
Law School's admissions policies are unconstitutional. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 821, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2001). In the alternative, he suggested that even if
racial diversity were a compelling state interest, the law school's admissions policy
was not sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 853.
23. Id. at 853.
24. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 808 (6th Cir. 2002).
25. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
26. Id. at 701 (quoting the admissions policy at the ATS).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 700-01.
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diversity in the student body. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed
that the Arlington School Board's use of race violated the
Constitution, but vacated Judge Bryan's remedial order, and
permitted the Arlington School Board to develop its own race-blind
alternatives.29
Similarly, Taxman presented a choice between race-conscious
decision-making and the use of a lottery.3" Sharon Taxman, a white
teacher, argued that her employer had violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 when it chose to lay her off instead of Debra
Williams, a black teacher.3 Under state law, the Board of Education
(the "Board") was required to select teachers for layoffs in order of
reverse seniority, but the two teachers most recently hired-Williams
and Taxman-were tied in seniority.32 After concluding that the two
teachers were equally qualified, the Board chose to invoke its
affirmative action policy and retain Debra Williams, rather than
resorting to a lottery to break the tie. A majority of the Third Circuit
Judges, sitting en banc, held that Taxman's layoff violated Title VII, in
essence requiring the Board to use a lottery rather than take racial
diversity into account. Of course, nothing in Title VII specifically
requires employers to conduct lotteries. However, in this case, the
Board had little choice. It had already considered every relevant
factor-classroom performance, evaluations, volunteerism, and
certifications-and concluded that the two teachers were "'of equal
ability"' and "'equal qualifications."' 33 Because no other criterion,
aside from race, remained on which to distinguish the two teachers,
the Board's sole remaining choice was to employ a lottery.34
In each of these three cases, the use of a lottery presented an
alternative to race-conscious decision-making. At least some of the
judges confronting that choice apparently preferred chance as a
method of allocating benefits, rather than allowing race to be a factor.
Before exploring the logic of that choice, two preliminary matters
require clarification.
First, a lottery might come into play as an alternative to race29. Id. at 708.
30. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
31. Although the school district is a public employer whose actions are
constrained by the Constitution, Taxman did not raise an equal protection challenge;
therefore, the constitutionality of the Board's plan was not before the court. Id. at
1552 n.5. Instead, Taxman rested her case on the claim that her layoff violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, which prohibits both private and
public employers from discriminating on the basis of race. Id. at 1552.
32. Id. at 1551.
33. Id. (quoting the Vice President of the Board of Education); see also id. at
1568-69 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
34. When confronted with such decisions in the past, the Board had broken
seniority ties through "'a random process which included drawing numbers out of a
container, drawing lots or having a lottery."' Id. at 1551 (quoting the Board of
Education).
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consciousness at different points in the decision-making process. In
Taxman, for example, the Board first considered the seniority,
qualifications, and experience of the two teachers before looking for a
method to break the tie." In such a situation, the decision-maker
resorts to a lottery only after all relevant criteria for selection have
been exhausted. Factors relevant to the decision, such as experience
or qualifications, determine most outcomes without resorting to a
lottery. The lottery acts as a tie-breaker, only operating at the
margins.
Alternatively, a lottery might be used as the sole, or at least the
primary, decision criterion for allocating a benefit. For example, in
Tuttle, the double-blind lottery was proposed as the primary method
for allocating spots in the kindergarten class at ATS. Aside from the
sibling preference,36 the Arlington School Board was not to use any
criteria other than chance to determine admissions. Although they
represent points on a spectrum rather than two distinct types,37 the
situations in Taxman and Tuttle respectively illustrate use of the
lottery as tie-breaker and as primary decision criterion.
In criticizing Michigan Law School's admissions policies, Judge
Boggs (dissenting) and Judge Friedman suggested the use of a lottery
as a primary decision criterion, not merely a tie breaker. According to
Judge Boggs, the Law School could have "conduct[ed] a lottery for all
students above certain threshold figures for their GPA and LSAT, 3
rather than following its existing policy, which takes account of race.
Applicants with minimally qualifying numbers would be eligible for
the lottery pool. Beyond that, the Law School could allocate places in
the incoming class entirely by lot. Interestingly, neither judge

35. Id.
36. Although the sibling preference was not specifically upheld, the plaintiff's suit
did not challenge this aspect of ATS's admissions policies nor did it seek to enjoin it.
Presumably, then, the order requiring a "'double-blind random lottery without the
use of any preferences,"' Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 703 (4th
Cir. 1999) (quoting the district court), was intended to replace the Board's weighted
lottery, leaving the sibling preference in place.
37. The lottery as tie-breaker and the lottery as primary decision criterion might
On closer
appear to represent two distinct types of decision-making tools.
examination, however, the distinction between the two is not so sharp. A lottery may
appear to operate as a tie-breaker, but only because the decision-maker failed to use
additional relevant criteria that could distinguish among claimants. Conversely, the
lottery as primary decision criterion might be recast as a tie-breaker if the decisionmaker in fact has no other basis on which to select winners. For example, if the
School Board could identify no relevant criteria beyond sibling enrollment to
distinguish among kindergarten applicants, one could characterize the use of a lottery
in the Tuttle situation as a tie-breaker rather than as a primary decision criterion.
Thus, "lottery as tie-breaker" and "lottery as primary decision criterion" are more
akin to points on a spectrum than discrete types. And where along that spectrum a
particular lottery falls depends upon one's view of the availability of alternative
relevant decision criteria.
38. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 808 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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suggested the Law School utilize lotteries as tie-breakers between
equally qualified applicants, rather than as the primary decision
criterion.
In suggesting a lottery, these judges were trying to
demonstrate the existence of alternatives "for increasing minority
enrollment" or promoting diversity. 39 A lottery that operated only on
the margins would do little, if anything, to advance those goals."
Moreover, determining the existence of a tie would be difficult, given
that the Law School's admissions process does not rely solely on
numerical rankings, but utilizes numerous "soft" variables, such as
recommendations, rigor of undergraduate education, essay quality,
residency, leadership and work experience as well. 1
A second preliminary matter concerns terminology.
Judges
typically refer to lotteries as "race-neutral" alternatives to raceconscious decision-making. 2
Although consistent with common
practice, this usage of the term is misleading. "Race-neutral" suggests
that the alternatives would have no effect on outcomes along racial
lines, much as "revenue neutral" policies are understood as not
affecting a fiscal bottom line. However, many so-called "race-neutral"
alternatives not only would alter racial outcomes, but they are
considered true alternatives to race-conscious policies because they
would have those effects, albeit without mentioning race. For
example, in Grutter, Judge Friedman pointed to "race-neutral"
policies such as increasing recruiting efforts for minority students, or
accepting a certain percentage of top graduates from certain schools,
as "alternative means for increasing minority enrollment."43
Similarly, in its briefs before the Supreme Court, the Bush
administration argued that the University of Michigan's admissions
policies were unconstitutional because "race-neutral" means existed
to achieve the same goals.'
It pointed to programs such as the
39. Any assessment of available alternatives turns on the purpose of the
challenged policy, and the efficacy of the alternatives in achieving that purpose.
Judge Friedman characterized that purpose as "increasing minority enrollment,"
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2001), while Judge Boggs
described it as promoting "a diversity of experiences and viewpoints." Grutter, 288
F.3d at 807.
40. Even using a lottery as a primary decision criterion, as Judge Boggs suggests,
would do little to increase minority enrollment, because so few are in the applicant
pool. As the University of Michigan reported in its briefs before the Supreme Court,
"The pool of minority applicants is extremely small, and is simply overwhelmed by
the raw numbers of white applicants at every level.... [For example,] in the LSAT
range (164+) from which more than 90% of the admitted white students are drawn,
the Law School received only 35 minority applicants compared to 900 white
applicants." Brief in Opposition at 8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003) (No.
02-241).
41. See Grutter,288 F.3d at 736.
42. See, e.g., id. at 806-08; Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706
(4th Cir. 1999).
43. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 852-53 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
44. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18-21,
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University of Texas' policy of admitting high school graduates in the
top ten percent of their class throughout the state as examples of such
alternatives. Ironically, after touting such plans as "race-neutral," the
United States went on to measure their success in terms of the
percentage of disadvantaged minority students enrolled under them.4 5
As Justice Souter points out, these "'percentage plans' are just as race
conscious as [Michigan's] point scheme (and fairly so), but they get
their racially diverse results without saying directly what they are
doing or why they are doing it."46 What makes the percentage plans,
and other such proposals, appear to be neutral alternatives to
affirmative action is that they do not explicitly mention race.
Nevertheless, and often by design, these plans are far from raceneutral in their effects. Thus, throughout this Essay, "race-blind"
refers to policies that do not explicitly mention race, and the term
"race-neutral" is reserved for policies that actually have no effect on
47
racial outcomes.
II. RACE V. CHANCE
Although Grutter, Tuttle, and Taxman each dealt with different
factual settings, a common question arose in each: when confronted
with a choice between race-conscious decision-making and a lottery,
which should be preferred? For colorblindness proponents, the
answer is easy. Any policy that explicitly takes account of race is
objectionable and, therefore, a lottery is always preferable. However,
without further elaboration, the colorblindness argument is circular:
decision-making should be colorblind because any consideration of
race is wrong. What requires explanation is why race-consciousness is
always wrong. Some forms of race-based decision-making are
obviously immoral; for example, laws preventing certain persons from
voting or owning property because of their race. To agree that such
laws are wrong, however, does not entail the conclusion that any form
of race-consciousness shares the same evil character.
Often, colorblindness is simply shorthand for a broader set of
arguments. Some of these arguments are legal, such as the claim that
government decision-making ought to be colorblind because the

Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241).
45. See id. at 14-17.
46. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2442 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at
2445 n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that calling the percentage plans "raceneutral" is disingenuous).
47. Determining whether or not a policy has any impact along racial lines entails
comparing alternative policy outcomes against some existing baseline, but choosing
the appropriate baseline is often controversial. In the context of higher education, an
implicit assumption is that "merit" admissions-based on test scores and gradesconstitute the baseline. However, very few, if any, highly selective college or graduate
programs rely solely on such quantitative measures.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Constitution demands it.48 Of course, many scholars vigorously
contest this interpretation, arguing that both the text and the history
of the Equal Protection Clause permit race-conscious policies that are
designed to benefit disadvantaged groups.49 Other arguments for
colorblindness are prudential in nature; for example, the assertion that
the use of race is inherently divisive, or that it promotes negative
racial stereotyping." Yet once again, these prudential concerns are
counterbalanced by evidence of the benefits of promoting racial
mixing and expanding opportunities for previously excluded groups."
Scholars and commentators have explored the legal and practical
arguments for and against affirmative action exhaustively, and so I
will not address them further here.
The focus of this Essay is the moral intuition-deeply held by
some-that taking account of race, whatever the purpose or effect of
doing so, is inherently wrong. Putting aside arguments about the
meaning of the Constitution or practical considerations, why is raceconscious decision-making inherently objectionable?
What more
basic notions of fairness underlie the insistence upon colorblindness?
A. Merit
One argument frequently made for colorblindness is that taking
account of race undermines meritocratic values.52 In this view, scarce
educational and employment opportunities ought to be distributed on
the basis of merit, as measured by individual abilities and
achievements, without regard to an arbitrary characteristic such as
race.
Those with superior qualifications are said to be more
deserving, and therefore, entitled to those opportunities in preference
to those less qualified. Taking race into account can frustrate these

48. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1979) (opposing the use
of racial classifications).
49. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale L.J. 2313 (1997);
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107
(1976); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427 (1997); Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 Va.
L. Rev. 753 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410
(1994).
50. See, e.g., Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and
White: One Nation, Indivisible (1997).
51. See, e.g., William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River LongTerm Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions
(1998).
52. See, e.g., Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social
Engineers, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1312 (1986); Terry Eastland, The Case Against
Affirmative Action, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 33 (1992); Antonin Scalia, The Disease as
Cure, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 147 (1979).
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legitimate expectations.
However, such claims have been broadly
criticized.
Philosophers challenge the notion that superior

qualifications create moral entitlement.54
Other commentators
question the empirical basis for merit-based claims, arguing that test
scores do not correlate closely with on-the-job productivity or future
academic performance, and fail to accurately measure individuals'

potential.55 Some critics reject the very notion of "merit" as merely a
reflection of existing power hierarchies that serves to reinforce

underlying structures of privilege.56
All these arguments are beside the point when the alternative to
race-consciousness is a lottery. For example, in Tuttle, concerns about
merit offer no reason for preferring, let alone mandating, a doubleblind admissions lottery, rather than a process that promotes racial
diversity. In fact, merit was explicitly disclaimed as a basis for
admission to ATS,57 and the notion of sorting and ranking prekindergartners by "merit" would strike most as offensive, if not
absurd. Arguments about merit are also largely irrelevant in Taxman

because the Board's alternative to considering race was not merit, but
chance." Sharon Taxman and Debra Williams were equal in seniority
and equally qualified in every respect relevant to their job
performance. The Board considered the affirmative action plan
precisely because it had exhausted all merit criteria.59 Given the
choice confronting the Board-utilizing its affirmative action plan or a

game of chance-merit principles offered no basis for choosing one
decision-making procedure over the other. 6°

53. This argument assumes that an objective, well-defined metric exists by which
to measure merit, and that jobs and schooling opportunities are in fact ordinarily
distributed according to these criteria.
54. See, e.g., K. Anthony Appiah & Amy Gutmann, Color Conscious: The
Political Morality of Race 118-38 (1996).
55. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire
Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 2129, 2219 (1992); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 Yale L.J. 1357,
1364 (1992); John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis
of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 313, 333-34 (1994); Yxta
Maya Murray, Merit-Teaching, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1073, 1075 (1996); Susan
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative
Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 955 (1996).
56. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 103 (1991)
("Standards are nothing more than structured preferences."); Calmore, supra note 55,
at 2219.
57. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999).
58. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1567 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting).
59. Id. at 1568-69.
60. In fact, the affirmative action plan at issue in Taxman expressly embraced the
primacy of traditional merit criteria. It required that "in all cases, the most qualified
candidate will be recommended for appointment." Id. at 1550. Only when candidates
were of equal qualification would the consideration of minority status come into play.
Thus, no violation of merit hierarchies was even contemplated under the School
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Similarly, concerns about merit cannot explain Judges Friedman's
and Boggs' suggestion that an admissions lottery would be preferable
to Michigan Law School's diversity policy. Assuming for the moment
that test scores and grades are an accurate and complete measure of
"merit," then meritocratic values would argue for maximizing these
quantitative indices in assembling a class. If, however, Michigan Law
School utilized a lottery as a primary decision criterion as suggested,
the resulting class would likely have lower LSAT scores and grades
than the class actually admitted.6 Under a narrow view of merit, the
admissions lottery works a more substantial disruption of meritocratic
62
values than the Law School's race-conscious admissions policy.
Given the choice between using a lottery as the primary decision
criterion and Michigan Law School's policy of promoting racial
diversity among other factors, a strict meritocrat should, if anything,
prefer the latter.
Although Judges Friedman and Boggs did not suggest it, the
admission process might incorporate a lottery solely as a tie-breaker
between equally qualified candidates. A school could make offers of
admission in rank order starting with the most qualified applicants,63
and resort to a lottery only when unable to distinguish between
equally qualified candidates at the margin. Assuming for the moment
that some uncontroversial measure of "merit" exists that would
permit rank ordering, this use of a lottery appears fully consistent with
meritocratic values. However, in such a situation-where all relevant
criteria have been exhausted-using race as a tie-breaker would be
equally consistent with meritocratic values. Of course, Grutter argued
that Michigan Law School used race as much more than a tie-breaker,
but because the school's admission process relied'on numerous nonquantitative factors, this assertion cannot be proved. Michigan Law
School admitted some white applicants with lower GPA and LSAT

Board's plan.
61. The majority in Grutter rejected a lottery system as a workable alternative in
part because of the recognition that it "would require a dramatic sacrifice of ...the
academic quality of all admitted students." Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2345
(2003).
62. The anti-meritocratic effects of a lottery have been noticed before. Duncan
Kennedy proposed an admissions lottery for law schools as a means of overcoming
"illegitimate hierarchy." Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of
Hierarchy 121-22 (1983) ("There should be a test designed to establish minimal skills
for legal practice and then a lottery for admission to the school; there should be
quotas within the lottery for women, minorities and working class students.").
63. This suggestion assumes that some uncontroversial method exists for rank
ordering applicants from most to least qualified and determining when a tie has
occurred. Michigan Law School, however, like most institutions of higher education,
does not rely solely on grades and test scores in making its admissions decisions.
Important factors such as rigor of undergraduate education, essay quality, and
strength of recommendations are not easily quantified and converted into rank
orderings.
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scores than Grutter. 6
If it considered those candidates more
qualified, despite their lower grades and test scores, it is quite possible
that the Law School found some of the African-American and
Mexican-American candidates with lower numbers than Grutter to be
as qualified as her, and used race merely as a tie-breaker.
Under some circumstances a lottery may be a reasonable decisionmaking tool, but not because it promotes meritocratic values.
Conversely, concerns about merit may be pressing in some
circumstances, but they cannot be the reason for categorically
opposing all forms of race-consciousness. Merit considerations may
be wholly irrelevant, as in Tuttle, or entirely indeterminate, as in
Taxman. If utilizing a lottery entails ignoring altogether relevant,
individual characteristics, meritocratic values may argue for some
types of race-conscious policies-those that take account of race as
one factor among many-rather than a wholly random decisionmaking process. Thus, if proponents of colorblindness prefer a lottery
to race-conscious decision-making in cases like Grutter, Tuttle and
Taxman, it cannot be because of concerns about merit.
B. Respect for Individuals
Colorblindness proponents also fault race-conscious policies for
failing to treat persons as individuals. They contend that people
should be judged according to their unique attributes, abilities, and
achievements. Taking account of race offends these values, they
argue, because it treats persons as members of a group, overlooking
relevant individual differences between them. Moreover, race is
something over which we have no control, and so it seems unfair to
distribute important benefits based on a characteristic we cannot
change. Because race is so rarely relevant to important decisions like
hiring and school admissions, utilizing race as a factor is arbitrary.
These arguments, however, cannot explain why a lottery is
preferable to race-conscious decision-making, because each objection
applies to chance-based decision-making processes as well. Using a
lottery as a primary decision criterion entails abandoning the effort to
differentiate among candidates based on their unique characteristics.
In a lottery, candidates are not judged by their individual abilities and
achievements. What matters is only whether or not one is in the pool
of legitimate claimants. Like race, chance is something over which we
have no control. Finally, lotteries, by definition, rely on a random
selection process, rather than attempting to identify factors relevant to
the decision at hand.
64. In the year Grutter applied, Michigan Law School accepted thirty-five white
applicants with a lower GPA, lower LSAT score or both. Deposition of Kinley
Larntz, Ph.D. at 38 of Ex. 68, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (No. 97-75928).
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Consider Judges Friedman's and Boggs' proposal that Michigan
Law School conduct an admissions lottery among all qualified
applicants. Under such a system, all that would matter is whether an
applicant's grades and test scores met the minimum numerical
requirements for inclusion in the lottery. All other potentially
relevant individual factors-the personal statement, letters of
recommendation, family background, leadership potential, and unique
experiences of the applicant-would be ignored.65 Instead, selection
for admission would be based on chance, a factor entirely beyond
individual control. Such a process hardly seems respectful of persons
as unique individuals.
Alternatively, the lottery might be used only as a tie-breaker,
avoiding these criticisms. The admissions process might treat each
applicant as an individual by carefully considering all available
personal information, resorting to a lottery only in the case of a tie
between candidates. Such use would not preclude consideration of
each individual's unique abilities and experiences. However, if such a
system fully respects the human dignity and individuality of each
applicant, so too does a system like Michigan Law School's, which
considers every applicant's file in its entirety, gives serious
consideration to individual qualities not captured by grades and test
scores, and takes account of race merely as a "plus" factor in close
cases.
This individualized consideration made a critical difference in how
the Supreme Court viewed Michigan Law School's admissions policies
in contrast to the undergraduate program. In an effort to achieve a
diverse student body, the undergraduate admissions policy
automatically awarded twenty points to each applicant from an
underrepresented minority group, as well as points for other
nonacademic factors such as state of residence, alumni relationships,
personal achievement, public service, or athletic ability.' Finding that
this inflexible, mechanical point system failed to assess each applicant
as an individual, a majority of the Court in Gratz struck down the
policy as not narrowly tailored.67 By contrast, the Court upheld the
Law School's policy, finding that it "engages in a highly
individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a
diverse educational environment."'
As the Court recognized in
Grutter, an admissions process that treats each applicant as an
65. The Supreme Court majority in Grutter noted that a lottery would render
impossible the sort of nuanced, individualized judgments that are made under the
Law School's existing practices, thereby defeating its efforts to assemble a student
body "diverse in ways broader than race." Grutter,123 S.Ct. at 2345.
66. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2419-20; id. at 2440-41 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id. at 2428-31.
68. Grutter,123 S.Ct. at 2343.
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individual, taking account of race as one factor among many, is fully
respectful of persons as individuals.6 9 Such a policy is more respectful
of the potential contribution of each individual than a colorblind
lottery that "would make that kind of nuanced judgment
impossible."70
The lottery itself, as a decision tool, is "blind to talent, need, and
desert.' 7 1
Although colorblindness proponents criticize raceconscious decision-making for ignoring merit-based claims and failing
to respect persons as individuals, lotteries are vulnerable to the same
objections. They do not allocate scarce opportunities according to
individual merit, nor do they take account of relevant individual
differences between claimants. Like race-conscious decision-making,
lotteries entail decision-making based on a factor beyond individual
control.
Perhaps the shared flaws of race-conscious and chance-based
decision-making processes should not be surprising, because race itself
is largely a matter of chance. It is mere happenstance that we are
born to particular parents, in a particular social context, with a
particular genetic heritage. We have no control over any of those
factors. Yet that constellation of factors determines the race of most
individuals, and constrains the possibilities for racial self-identification
for all. This assertion does not entail resurrection of any essentialist
notions of race. Genetic inheritance does not define the individual.
However, precisely because race is socially constructed, one's
ancestry, together with a particular social context, has a determinative
influence over one's racial definition.
Ironically, while race itself is merely a matter of chance, some argue
that chance is a better decision criterion than race. Why should the
arbitrariness of chance be preferable to the arbitrariness of race? The
preference for chance over race suggests that race is worse than
arbitrary. If this is so-and this notion accords with our intuitions-it
is not because of anything inherent in the category of race itself, but
because of our particular history and the meaning that our history has
invested in the use of racial categories. The outlines of that history
are well-known; from the forced migration of African slave labor early
in the process of European settlement, to the legally enforced
separation of whites and blacks in the era of Jim Crow, to the
internment of thousands of U.S. citizens solely because of their
Japanese ancestry during World War II. The victims of these and
other injustices were denominated by race, burdening that
classification with a social and historical significance far beyond any
other conventional grouping of individuals.

69. See id.
70. Id. at 2345.
71. Duxbury, supra note 20, at 51.
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The argument for colorblindness, then, implicitly draws its force
from history. The harm inflicted in each of the above historical
examples resulted from the use that was made of race, not anything
intrinsic to the category itself. Colorblindness proponents ignore this
distinction, attempting to harness the moral revulsion against slavery
and Jim Crow, and direct it against contemporary efforts to
ameliorate the effects of racial subordination. In the absence of that
history, however, taking race into account appears no more irrelevant
or arbitrary than many other decisions by governmental or private
actors that are readily tolerated. Apart from history, there is no
reason to attribute a special odiousness to race-conscious decisionmaking.
III. WEIGHING BURDENS

An awareness of our history rightfully makes us wary of how race
may be used. At the same time, the particular facts of that history
also motivate
race-conscious decision-making
in allocating
opportunities today. Precisely because oppression and disadvantage
have been imposed along racial lines, taking account of race is seen as
necessary to reverse generations of subordination and inequality.
Colorblindness proponents profess to share this ultimate goal, but
insist that the means used must not explicitly mention race. In any
other context, it would appear quite odd to insist that a pressing social
problem be addressed without reference to the dimension along which
it occurs. What, then, justifies the claim that problems of racial
inequality should be addressed without mentioning race?
As discussed above, the term colorblindness operates as shorthand
for other, more basic fairness arguments. Juxtaposing race and
chance, however, reveals that an insistence on colorblindness is not
always consistent with the arguments that purportedly motivate it.
Concerns about merit or respect for individuals cannot explain why a
lottery is always preferable to race-conscious decision-making.
Colorblindness proponents, however, raise another objection to raceconscious policies. Although race and chance are both arbitrary
decision criteria, taking account of race, unlike a lottery,
systematically disadvantages certain groups. They argue that if raceconscious policies are used to benefit previously excluded minorities,
whites will suffer as a result.
While this argument has some force, it is crucial to be clear about
the nature of that harm. In the typical challenge to affirmative action,
white plaintiffs argue that they would have obtained the opportunity
in question had it not been for their race. Often, however, it is far
from clear that the white plaintiffs would have succeeded if the
challenged policy did not exist. This point is obscured by the tendency
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to assume that white challengers would have gotten the job or been
admitted to the program absent consideration of race."
The
contingency of this assumption, however, becomes quite clear in cases
in which a lottery is the alternative decision criterion.
In Tuttle, the white plaintiffs who sought admission to ATS had no
established right to attend that school. Even under the double-blind
lottery they sought, they faced a strong probability-over seventy
percent-that they would not have been admitted.73 Similarly, in
Taxman, the fact that Debra Williams had equal seniority and equal
qualifications foreclosed any claim that Taxman was entitled to retain
her job. If the Board had chosen to ignore diversity considerations,
and used a lottery to decide between the two teachers, Taxman still
would have had no more than a fifty percent chance of avoiding
layoff.74 In both Tuttle and Taxman, had the plaintiffs lost the lottery,
they would have faced exactly the same consequences-rejection from
ATS or loss of a job-but they could not claim to have been harmed.
Thus, the burden imposed by taking race into account should not be
equated with the lost opportunity, for both plaintiffs might have lost
that opportunity through a colorblind lottery as well.
In the context of selective university admissions, it is similarly
problematic to assume that white plaintiffs who challenge raceconscious admissions policies would have been admitted in the
absence of those policies. That assumption can lead to absurd
conclusions, such as the comment that "[I]n order to accommodate a
few less-qualified black students, the University of Texas Law School,
like other leading law schools, must turn down hundreds or thousands
of academically superior white students every year."75
Such a
proposition is mathematically impossible of course, but it was implicit
in the claims of the plaintiffs in Hopwood v. Texas that affirmative
action deprived them of admission to Texas Law School. In fact, the
courts ultimately determined that Hopwood and her three co72. The potency of this claim was exploited in a political advertisement aired by
Jesse Helms during his 1990 campaign to retain his Senate seat in the face of a
challenge by Harvey Gantt, an African-American. The commercial said, "'You
needed that job, and you were the best qualified ....But it had to go to a minority
because of a racial quota."' Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White,
Separate, Hostile, Unequal 202 (1992). On a theoretical level, Cheryl Harris has
captured this assumption of entitlement as a manifestation of an implicitly recognized
property interest in whiteness. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv.
L. Rev. 1707, 1767 n.261 (1993).
73. In 1998, ATS had 185 applicants for 69 available positions. Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999). After the Board admitted the 23
applicants with siblings already enrolled at ATS, 46 spots remained to be allocated
among the 162 non-sibling applicants. Id. at 702. In the absence of any other
preferences, these non-sibling applicants each stood a 28.4% chance of being
admitted.
74. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996).
75. Michael Lind, The Next American Nation 166 (1995) (emphasis added).
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plaintiffs "had no reasonable chance of being
admitted to the Law
76
School under a race-blind admission system.

Even if white challengers like Hopwood and her co-plaintiffs were
unlikely to succeed in the absence of race-conscious policies, standing
doctrine nevertheless permits them to sue. In Northeastern Florida
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v.
Jacksonville, 7 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff challenging
race-conscious governmental policies need not allege that he or she
would have obtained the benefit in the absence of the policy. Rather,

"the inability to compete on an equal footing" is considered an "injury
in fact" sufficient for standing purposes."
Recognizing such an
"intangible injury'"" may make sense when deciding whether a
plaintiff should be permitted to pursue an equal protection claim in
court. However, the "inability to compete on an equal footing" is a

quite different, and much lesser, harm than the very concrete harmsloss of a job, government contract, or educational opportunity- that
are sometimes blamed on race-conscious policies.8"
How does "the inability to compete on an equal footing" cause
harm, if the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed anyway? Here again, the
cases that juxtapose race-conscious decision-making and lotteries

76. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 272 (5th Cir. 2000). Hopwood and the other
unsuccessful applicants who challenged Texas Law School's admissions policies all
had significant weaknesses in their applications. Poor academic records, relatively
uncompetitive undergraduate institutions, or missing reference letters meant that
none of the Hopwood plaintiffs was likely to have succeeded even absent the
affirmative action program. Id. at 269-72.
Similarly, in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), despite
Justice Powell's conclusion that Davis Medical School's special admissions program
caused Bakke's rejection, it appears highly unlikely that he would have been admitted
even in its absence. The Court's order that Bakke be admitted rested on the
University's strategic choice not to contest his admissibility, rather than any factual
finding that he actually would have been admitted in the absence of the program. In
fact, the trial court had concluded he would not have been admitted. See Goodwin
Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions,
100 Mich. L. Rev. 1045, 1056-60 (2002).
77. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
78. Id. at 666; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211
(1995).
79. See Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 883 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
80. As explained by the district court in Hopwood, cases challenging the use of
racial preferences involve two types of injury. First, an "intangible injury" may result
from the government's discriminatory classification which prevents a plaintiff from
'competing on an equal footing."' Id. at 883 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211).
Alleging such an intangible injury is sufficient for standing purposes. "A second,
tangible type of injury-an injury in-fact-occurs when a plaintiff is actually denied
some right or benefit, such as admission to the law school .. " Id. In the context of a
selective admission process, it cannot be the case that all rejected nonminority
applicants, who vastly outnumber accepted minority applicants, were denied
admission because of their race. See id. at 884. For example, "an applicant who has no
conceivable chance of admission cannot possibly show that race was a substantial or
motivating factor in the.., decision to deny him or her admission." Id.
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27

illuminate the question. In Tuttle, the district court ordered a raceblind lottery to allocate the remaining spots in the kindergarten
class.8 ' Without a sibling already at ATS, the white plaintiffs in Tuttle
stood a 28.4% chance of gaining admission through a race-blind
lottery.82 Under the Arlington School Board's diversity policy, their
chances of admission fell to 23%.83 The use of race as a factor was

unlikely responsible for even the full 5.4% drop in their chances of
admission.

weighed

Because the Arlington School Board's system also

low-income

background

and

English

as

a

second

language' -factors that correlate with race-their inclusion likely
contributed to the white plaintiffs' reduced chances of admission as
well. The concrete impact of the Arlington School Board's policy,
then, was not to deny the plaintiffs places in the kindergarten class at
ATS, but to decrease their odds of admission by something less than
5.4%.85

The "equal footing" argument thus amounts to a complaint that
race-conscious decision-making changes the odds of success for white
applicants.86

Whether or not altering the odds in this way is fair

depends in part upon whether the initial distribution of the
probabilities of selection was fair. I will return to this point infra, but
81. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 700-01 (4th Cir. 1999).
82. See id. at 702 (stating that 162 non-sibling applicants competed for 46 available
positions).
83. See id. at 702 n.4.
84. Id.
85. One might alternatively characterize the plaintiffs' loss by saying that the
percentage reduction in their odds of success was 19%; that is, a 5.4% drop in their
odds of success, divided by their expected chance of 28.4%, amounts to a 19%
reduction in their overall odds.
Although mathematically accurate, this
characterization removes from view the expected chance of success in the absence of
any race-conscious policy. Particularly when that chance was low to begin with,
expressing the loss in terms of a percentage reduction in odds misleadingly suggests a
greater absolute loss to white plaintiffs than is in fact the case.
86. Liu argues that in the context of higher education, it is possible to distinguish
three kinds of rejected white applicants: (1) those who would have been admitted
under a race-blind policy; (2) those who would have been admitted only if they were a
member of a preferred minority group under a policy giving racial preferences; and
(3) those who had no chance of admission, regardless of whether or not racial
preferences were used. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1081-94. To illustrate this typology,
Liu examines the applications of three of the white plaintiffs who brought suit
challenging the University of Georgia's undergraduate admissions policies. Id. at
1081-92. Because Georgia's undergraduate admissions process utilized cutoff scores
to determine automatic admissions and automatic rejections, as well as a quantitative
index that took account of race at the next stage of the process, it is possible in that
case to identify at least three distinct categories of rejected white applicants as Liu
suggests. See Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 126667 (11th Cir. 2001). However, under admissions systems like Michigan Law School's,
that do not utilize cutoff scores or give a numerical "boost" based on race, rejected
white applicants cannot easily be sorted into these three categories. Conceptualizing
the "equal footing" argument as "changing the odds of success" captures white
plaintiffs' complaints about race-conscious policies regardless of the particular type of
decision-making process used.
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it bears emphasis now that the degree of burden imposed by "the
inability to compete on an equal footing" depends upon how great a
change in the odds results from taking race into account. If
considering race alters white plaintiffs' odds of success only slightly,
that fact ought to influence substantive judgments of a policy's
fairness.' Where evidence indicates that the plaintiff was unlikely to
have succeeded in any case, the burden imposed by race-conscious
policies is far less than the loss of the job or opportunity in question.'
The impact of race-consciousness in university admissions similarly
can be understood as changing the odds of admission. White plaintiffs
challenging these policies often point to different rates of acceptance
of black and white applicants as evidence that race has a large impact
on outcomes. The problem with this argument, however, is that it
conflates the benefits of affirmative action to applicants from
preferred minority groups with the costs to individual white
applicants. In fact, as Goodwin Liu has demonstrated, the basic
arithmetic of highly selective admissions indicates that the effect of
race-conscious policies on white admissions rates is slight.s9 As Liu
explains, the small size of the minority applicant pool and the use of
non-objective admissions criteria mean that racial preferences have
very little effect on the chance of admission for any individual
member of the much larger class of white applicants."
Using data from twenty-eight selective colleges and universities, Liu
estimates the effects of affirmative action on white applicants' chances
of admission.91 For a given range of SAT scores, he assumes that the
same number of applicants would have been admitted under a raceblind process as were in fact admitted under existing policies. 2 That
number, divided by the total number of applicants with scores in that
interval, produces "the hypothetical likelihood of admission for an

87. In equal protection terms, the requirement of narrow tailoring entails
consideration of the burden imposed on non-minorities. Cf Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1985). Similarly, the permissibility of affirmative action
under Title VII depends upon the impact on the interests of non-minorities. See
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
88. Under these circumstances, no particular white applicant can claim that he or
she would have gotten the opportunity in question in the absence of a race-conscious
policy. Nevertheless, someone would have. Thus, one might argue that the somewhat
diminished chances of many white applicants in the aggregate constitutes a significant
burden. This argument, however, is inconsistent with the constitutional interpretation
that equal protection rights are "personal rights," "guaranteed to the individual,"
rather than to groups. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)); see also Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ...
protect persons,not groups.").
89. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1063.
90. See id. at 1074.
91. Id. at 1072-78.
92. Id. at 1074.
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average applicant" in that SAT interval.9" Liu then compares this
hypothetical likelihood of admission with actual admission rates.94 His
calculations show that while black applicants benefited significantly
from affirmative action, white applicants' chances of admission were
not significantly affected.95 For example, 19.3% of whites scoring in
the 1200-1249 range on the SAT were admitted, while their expected
rate of admission under a race-blind system would be 22.5%.96
Barbara Grutter's claim that Michigan Law School's diversity policy
harmed her is susceptible to a similar analysis. Grutter's application
reported a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161.9 In
her briefs, Grutter alleges that if she were a member of a preferred
minority group, she would have been admitted to Michigan Law
School. 98 This argument, however, misleadingly magnifies the harm
she allegedly suffered by equating it with the benefit afforded
underrepresented minority applicants under the diversity policy.
Grutter, however, did not seek to be treated as a preferred minority
candidate, but to abolish the diversity policy altogether. Thus, the

93. Id.
94. Id. at 1075 tbl.1.
95. See id.
96. See id. Liu suggests that his estimates likely overstate the effect of affirmative
action on white applicants, because of differences between racial groups in "yield;"
that is, the rate at which accepted applicants actually matriculate. Id. at 1076.
Because a lower proportion of black candidates accept offers of admissions, more
offers are necessary to attain a target class size. Id. A plausible assumption is that
black yield would rise in the absence of affirmative action, meaning that fewer offers
of admission would need to be made and overall acceptance rates would drop. See id.
Adjusting for the effects of racial differences in yield, Liu estimates that the effect of
abolishing preferences would be even less, with white admission rates rising to only
20.6% from 19.3% for applicants with SAT scores in the 1200-1249 range. See id. at
1078 tbl.2. Calculating yield-adjusted admissions rates across the spectrum of SAT
scores leads him to conclude that "the impact of racial preferences on the odds of
admission facing white applicants is remarkably slight." Id. at 1077.
97. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003).
98. In the year she applied for admission, only 19.3% of Caucasian applicants, but
100% of African-American and Mexican-American applicants with similar grades and
scores were admitted. See Deposition of Kinley Larntz, Ph.D. at 37-39 of Ex. 68,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928). This
difference in admission rates appears stark; however, isolating these numbers for
comparison is misleading. First, the percentages for African-American and MexicanAmerican applicants are quite unstable. Only 5 African-Americans and 1 MexicanAmerican fell into this cell. See id. at 37 of Ex. 68, 39 of Ex. 68. If one or two
admission decisions were made differently, the percentages would change
dramatically. In addition, isolating outcomes for a single cell obscures the fact that in
many of the cells on the grid, applicants of all races were treated nearly identically.
For example, applicants with GPAs of 3.75 and above and LSATs in the 167-169
range were virtually certain to be admitted, regardless of race. See id. at 37-39 of Ex.
68. In this cell, 100% of African-American and Mexican-American, and 99% of
Caucasian applicants were admitted. See id. Similarly, applicants in cells at the
opposite corner of the grid-those with low LSAT scores and low GPAs-were also
treated similarly in that virtually all were rejected. See id.
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degree of improvement in her odds of admission under a race-blind
policy is the appropriate measure of her harm.
In fact, the impact of Michigan Law School's diversity policy on
Grutter's chances of admission was quite small. Utilizing Liu's
methodology, one can calculate the likelihood of Grutter's admission
under a race-blind policy, by assuming that Michigan Law School
would accept the same number of applicants for each combination of
GPA and LSAT score. In the year Grutter applied, 29 out of 135, or
21.5% of all applicants with similar GPAs and LSAT scores were
admitted. 9 The acceptance rate for Caucasians with these grades and
scores under the Law School's diversity policy was 1 9 .3 %.1° Thus,
under a race-blind admissions policy Grutter's odds of admission
would have been 2.2% higher. 10 1
Juxtaposing race and chance reveals that race-consciousness does
not necessarily (or even often) entail depriving whites of fixed
entitlements to particular educational or economic opportunities.
Rather, the impact of affirmative action is more accurately
characterized as altering white applicants' odds of success.
Understood in this way, the degree of burden imposed by raceconscious policies will vary enormously from one situation to another.
Moreover, because white applicants far outnumber minority
applicants in many situations, the impact on any given individual may
be quite minimal; often a matter of changing the odds of success by
only a few percentage points.
IV. CHANGING ODDS

Although the burden imposed on individual whites is typically much
less than claimed by the rhetoric, the fact remains that taking race into
account alters the relative odds of success of different racial groups.
99. See id. at 35 of Ex. 68.
100. See id. at 38 of Ex. 68.
101. Of course, any estimate of Grutter's chance of admission absent the diversity
policy is subject to some uncertainty. On the one hand, Liu's analysis suggests that
adjusting for differences in black and white yield would lead to a smaller estimate of
the change in her odds of admission. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1076-78. On the other
hand, one might question the assumption that Michigan Law School would accept the
same number of applicants at each GPA/LSAT level in the absence of the diversity
policy. If the Law School would admit proportionally more applicants at the higher
GPA/LSAT ranges under a race-blind admissions policy, then the estimate of
Grutter's odds of admission would be somewhat higher. It is, of course, impossible to
calculate these adjustments with precision; however, the uncertainties introduced by
assumptions about yield and the distribution of admissions offers cut in opposite
directions. Perhaps more importantly, discretionary factors would continue to play a
significant role in admissions decisions even absent considerations of race. Under
existing policy, Michigan Law School does not accept white applicants in rank order
according to grades and test scores. So long as discretionary factors remain
important, and white applicants far outnumber those from preferred minority groups,
the impact of race-conscious policies on applicants like Grutter will be relatively
small.
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Viewed in this light, lotteries may appear more fair than raceconscious policies, because they distribute the probabilities of success
equally among all potential claimants. This argument, however,
overlooks two critical points. First, whether changing the odds of
success is objectionable depends upon whether or not the initial
distribution of the probabilities of success is fair. Second, even if
some existing distribution of the odds of success is acceptable,
departures from that distribution do not necessarily violate any moral
entitlements. In fact, most policy decisions entail "changing the odds"
in one way or another, often on a racial dimension.
Consider first the fairness of the initial distribution of odds. The
unweighted lottery appears fair because each person in the pool has
an equal chance of selection. The lottery may nevertheless produce
biased outcomes, however, depending upon how people become
eligible to enter the pool. 2 If, for example, information about the
opportunity to enter a lottery is not evenly disseminated, or applicants
are required to satisfy certain requirements to enter the pool, certain
individuals or groups may be more likely to participate in the lottery.
In this case, even if the lottery operates in an unbiased manner,
unequal chances of entering the pool mean that the use of a lottery as
a decision criterion will produce biased outcomes.
The diversity policy challenged in Tuttle was likely a response to
one such situation. The Arlington County School Board's goal in
operating ATS was to make its resources available to "the diverse
groups of students in the district."' 3 Use of a double-blind lottery
could be consistent with that goal, but only if all entering
kindergarteners were equally likely to apply to ATS. However,
proportionally far fewer lower income, non-native English speaking
and Black and Hispanic parents applied for spots at ATS for their
children.i" Perhaps the differing rates of applications across groups
reflect different educational preferences. More plausibly, however,
informational barriers made it difficult for some parents to learn
about ATS, evaluate the educational opportunity it offers, and
negotiate the application process. Non-English speakers face obvious
obstacles. In addition, racial minorities and low-income families
typically lack access to social networks where valuable information
about school quality and educational outcomes is shared. If, in fact,
these sorts of barriers systematically discourage certain groups from
entering the pool, the use of an unweighted lottery will simply

102. See Duxbury, supra note 20, at 100-02.
103. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999).
104. For example, 43% of public school students county-wide did not speak
English as a first language, but these students constituted only 11.9% of the applicant
pool to ATS. See id. at 702 n.4. Similarly, low-income, Black and Hispanic students
constituted 40%, 17% and 31% of the students county-wide, but only 13.5%, 8.6%
and 10.8% of the applicant pool respectively. See id.
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reproduce these biases in the ultimate admissions decisions. Thus, the
fairness of a lottery depends not only on the chance that each
applicant in the pool will be selected, but also the chance for all
potential claimants to enter the pool in the first place.
A similar analysis can be applied to Grutter's situation. An
admissions lottery is only appealing if one ignores the process by
which the pool of qualified applicants is generated. Undoubtedly,
Grutter's chance of admission would have improved if Michigan Law
School had conducted a lottery offering equal chances of admission to
all qualified applicants. °5 But it is equally certain that not all children
have equal chances of acquiring the credentials necessary to be
included in the qualified applicant pool. Consider that the black
unemployment rate is more than double that of whites,0 6 and that the
median income for black households is 34% less than for white
households.017 Moreover, the poverty rate for black Americans is
nearly two and a half times that for whites, with an alarming 32.7% of
black children living below the poverty line. 0 8 Entrenched patterns of
segregation mean that many African-American and Hispanic children
lack access to quality schools, and are deprived of valuable social
capital-the access to networks, information, and mentoring necessary
to take advantage of educational and economic opportunities.
Given the stark differences in measures of economic well-being and
access to social and educational resources, blacks and whites do not
face anything close to equal odds of qualifying for admission to
Michigan Law School, or any other highly competitive educational
opportunity. As discussed above, the "equal footing" argument
amounts to a claim that affirmative action harms whites by reducing
their odds of success. However, if the concern is statistical fairness,
then the odds of the racial lottery is arguably a greater public policy
concern than a diversity policy that shifts whites' odds of success by a
few percentage points.
Proponents of colorblindness will likely object that this line of
argument fails to treat Barbara Grutter as an individual. Some white
applicants, they argue, will have suffered greater deprivations and
105. It is impossible to calculate exactly how much Grutter's chance would improve
without a clear definition of who is "qualified." However, using an admissions lottery
would have the biggest impact on the very highest scoring applicants, whose chances
would drop from a near certainty of admission to the same level as all the other
applicants. Obviously, one must evaluate the fairness of any given admissions system
based on its impact on all applicants, not merely one subset.
106. The unemployment rate among black Americans in 2000 was 7.6%, versus
3.5% for whites in the same year. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001, at 368 tbl.569 (121st ed. 2001).
107. In 1999, the median income for white households was $42,504; median income
for black households was $27,910. Id. at 433 tbl.662.
108. The percentage of persons below the poverty level was 23.6% for blacks and
9.8% for whites in 1999. Id. at 442 tbl.679. In that same year, 32.7% of black children
and 12.9% of white children were living below the poverty level. Id. tbl.680.
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overcome greater obstacles than some black applicants, and thus,
preferences that rely on group-based generalizations are unfair."°9
However, the process of defining the pool of "qualified" applicants
itself necessarily involves group-based judgments. Unless the lottery
were open to all, some decision would have to be made about the
threshold level of GPA and LSAT scores that would qualify
applicants for inclusion in the lottery. Such a decision would itself rest
on statistical generalizations about how a group of individuals-those
with similar grades and LSAT scores-are likely to perform in the
future. Because of the uncertainty inherent in test scores, some
applicants with scores below the qualifying level would perform as
well or better than some applicants with higher scores. Although
group-based generalizations of this sort also ignore relevant individual
differences, their use is widely accepted.
A more fundamental difficulty, however, besets claims based on
statistical fairness. Justice does not require that the odds for success
must always be equally distributed among all potential claimants. In
fact, in most areas of social decision-making, imposing equal chances
of selection would be considered not only unwise, but unfair.
Imagine, for example, the reaction to a requirement that a university
or corporation chose among all qualified candidates for President or
CEO by lot. It is commonly expected, even demanded, that selection
will occur through the application of some relevant criteria, even
though the choice of particular criteria will increase some applicants'
chances of success relative to others.
Of course, profound
disagreements often exist as to which criteria are relevant and what
weight they should be given. Yet, the important point is that any
policy decision, even purely procedural ones, may alter claimants'
relative odds of success. The mere fact that a policy decision changes
the odds-even if the prior distribution of odds was acceptable-does
not in itself create unfairness.
Consider the admissions policy for ATS in Tuttle. Among the pool
of applicants, ATS first offered admission to those with a sibling
already attending ATS." ° Then, it held a weighted lottery among the
non-sibling applicants, giving preference to students with certain
characteristics."' In striking down the ATS admissions policy, the
Fourth Circuit limited its analysis to the race/ethnicity factor, 2
implicitly permitting the Arlington School Board to continue to alter
the odds by weighting the economic and language factors. However,
the biggest factor "skewing the odds" of admission-the sibling
109. As discussed above, however, this objection cannot explain why an admissions
lottery would be morally preferable, as it too fails to treat applicants as unique
individuals.
110. See Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 1999).
111. Id. at 701.
112. Id. at 705.
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preference-was not even challenged by the Tuttle plaintiffs. Because
they did not have a sibling already enrolled at ATS, their chances of
admission dropped from 37.3% to 28.4%, a larger reduction than that
caused by all three of the diversity factors combined.113 The point
here is not that the sibling preference was wrong or a bad policy, but
simply that any policy choice will alter the odds of success. Even a
decision to increase advertising and outreach efforts would impact
Tuttle's odds of selection, simply by increasing the size of the
applicant pool for a fixed number of slots. Thus, the mere fact that a
policy alters the odds of selection is not a legitimate basis for
objection.
Nor is a policy inherently unfair because it changes the odds along
racial lines. To argue otherwise would be to claim that a broad swath
of existing laws is unfair. Because blacks and whites differ on a wide
range of economic measures, decisions regarding everything from
fiscal policy to welfare reform are likely to impact different racial
groups differently.
Undoubtedly, recognition of this likelihood
motivates the doctrine stating that disproportionately adverse effects
on a racial minority
are not sufficient to show an Equal Protection
14
Clause violation.
Even the race-blind alternatives to affirmative action put forward
by its opponents typically alter the relative odds of success for blacks
and whites. In Tuttle, for example, the Fourth Circuit pointed to
several options still available to the Arlington School Board, such as
including all entering kindergarteners county-wide in a random lottery
for spots at ATS." 5 Although the court described this option as "raceneutral," it would in fact tend to shift the relative odds of admission
for Black and Hispanic students, compared with white applicants.
Because proportionally more whites would be in a pool formed by
self-selection, the shift to a universal, county-wide lottery would lower
the relative odds that a white student would be selected for admission.
Similarly, in criticizing Michigan Law School's diversity policy as not
narrowly tailored, Judge Friedman mentioned several "race-neutral
alternatives," all of which would affect whites' relative odds of

113. Because ATS had 185 applicants for 69 available spots, id. at 701, each
applicant would have had a 37.3% chance of admission if no preferences were
applied. Once the 23 sibling-applicants were offered places, id. at 702, 162 applicants
remained for 46 spots, with a 28.4% chance of admission each.
114. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
115. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706 n.11. The other alternative policies identified by
the court were to "[a]ssign a small geographic area to identified alternative schools as
the home school for that area, and fill the remaining spaces in the entering class by
means of an unweighted random lottery from a self-selected applicant pool," id., and
to "allot[] a certain number of slots at each alternative school" to each neighborhood
school. Id. These two suggested alternatives are also unlikely to be "race-neutral" in
their effects.
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admission.1 6 He pointed to policies, such as increasing recruiting
efforts for minority students, or accepting an established percentage
of top graduates from certain schools as "alternative means for
increasing minority enrollment."11 7
These policies are true
alternatives to a race-conscious diversity policy precisely because they
also tend to shift the odds of admission along racial lines.
Thus, many policies that shift claimants' odds for success, even
along racial lines, are not objected to on that basis.
What
distinguishes the alternatives deemed acceptable to colorblindness
proponents is not that they have no impact on outcomes, but that they
do not explicitly mention race.
V. COLORBLINDNESS

Examining the preference for chance over race reveals the inherent
circularity of insisting on colorblindness for its own sake: raceconscious decision-making is objectionable because any consideration
of race is wrong.
The values that purportedly motivate
colorblindness-concerns about merit, treating persons as individuals,
and not disrupting settled entitlements-caution against some uses of
race, but not all. In addition, the fact that race-conscious policies alter
the odds of success along racial lines does not distinguish them from
widely accepted forms of social policy decision-making. Only the
explicit mention of race does.
Yet, despite its circularity,
colorblindness claims have attained a certain gravity in debates over
the permissibility of race-conscious decision-making. Three rhetorical
moves-each reinforced by the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence -help mask this inherent circularity.
First, as I suggested at the outset, the Court's three-tiered approach
to equal protection doctrine makes race appear uniquely problematic.
By singling out race-conscious decision-making for the highest level of
scrutiny, equal protection doctrine suggests that race is exceptional in
its arbitrariness. As the comparison with a lottery reveals, however,
the arbitrariness of race is not distinctive. In fact, much arbitrariness
and even outright unfairness not only exists, but is legally tolerated in
our system for distributing opportunities and benefits. For example,
Title VII case law makes it clear that employers are free to make all
sorts of arbitrary, irrational, and unfair personnel decisions, free from
judicial scrutiny.118 What makes race distinctive is that it has
historically been used to subordinate certain racial groups, not merely

116. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
117. See id. at 852-53.
118. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993); see also
Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997); Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52 (1st
Cir. 1995) (holding that an employer's failure to promote a black woman, motivated
by cronyism rather than discrimination, did not violate Title VII).
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that it is capable of being used in arbitrary ways." 9 The equal
protection doctrine, by reserving strict scrutiny for racial
classifications, implicitly suggests that something inherent in race,
rather than120 the ways in which it has been used, constitutes the
unfairness.
The second rhetorical move involves narrowing the frame of
reference to exclude relevant arguments from consideration. A
lottery appears fair if attention is focused solely on the equal
probability of selecting any participant in the pool. However, its
fairness also depends upon how eligible claimants are identified.
Narrowing the frame allows one to ignore the fairness of the process
that determines who is eligible to participate. Similarly, in claiming
that race-conscious policies unfairly burden whites, colorblindness
proponents focus only on the discrete decision at issue-who gets
hired or promoted or admitted to law school. This limited perspective
excludes from view the social conditions that result in minority underrepresentation in the applicant pool. Once again, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence implicitly endorses this rhetorical move, by
holding that "[s]ocietal discrimination, without more,2 1 is too
amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.'
Third, colorblindness attempts to equate all contemporary forms of
race-conscious decision-making-regardless of their purpose, intent,
or effects-with the historical oppression of people of color solely on
the basis of their race. This move is encouraged by the Court's notion
of "consistency, ' 122 under which all forms of race-conscious decisionmaking, regardless of who is benefited and who is burdened, are
subject to the same exacting standard of review. Although Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority in Grutter, notes that strict scrutiny
requires consideration of "relevant differences," and that "[n]ot every

119. As Justice Ginsburg writes, "Our jurisprudence ranks race a 'suspect'
category, 'not because [race] is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because
it is one which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of
maintaining racial inequality."' Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2444 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Norwalk Core v. Norwalk
Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968)).
120. As Jed Rubenfeld points out, the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence has undergone a subtle, but significant, shift. What began as a concern
with protecting "suspect classes"-those subject to a history of purposeful
discrimination -has transmogrified into a fixation with "suspect classifications;" that
is, ending any conscious acknowledgment of racial differences in policy making.
Classifications have become talismanic, while the original purpose of strict scrutinyto smoke-out racially invidious purposes against vulnerable social groups-has been
lost to a formalistic insistence on consistency. See Rubenfeld, supra note 49, at 427-72.
121. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,276 (1986).
122. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995)
("[C]onsistency ...recognize[s] that any individual suffers an injury when he or she is
disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever that race may
be.").
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decision influenced by race is equally objectionable," ' she does not
repudiate her earlier insistence on "consistency." Writing for the
majority in Gratz, Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterates that the standard
of review "'is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification.' ' 124 This adherence to the
language of "consistency" encourages the efforts of colorblindness
proponents to equate the evils of slavery and segregation with efforts
at racial remediation.
The consistency argument overlooks the differing role that race
plays in different types of policies. When race is used to oppress, little
else matters. Freedom from slavery, 25 the right to testify in court, 26
the right to attend certain schools, 2 1 or to sit in certain places,' 2 all
turned on the issue of how a person was racially classified. By
contrast, the kinds of race-conscious decisions challenged today rarely
entail making judgments solely on the basis of race. Barbara Grutter,
for example, might complain that in the absence of Michigan Law
School's diversity policy, her chance of admission would have risen
from 19.3% to 21.5%, but had she scored just a few points higher on
the LSAT, her chance would have risen even more, to 50.4%, even
under the existing diversity policy.129 Thus, far from being the sole
basis for decision, race matters relatively little for white outcomes in
decisions such as law school admissions that involve multiple
criteria. 30
Moreover, an even more critical difference separates historical
examples of race-based oppression and contemporary race-conscious
policies, rendering the consistency argument problematic. As Justice
Ginsburg writes, "Actions designed to burden groups long denied full
citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to
hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its after effects
have been extirpated."' 31 The evil contained in Jim Crow laws lay not
in the mere fact of racial classification, but the motivation behind that
classification. 3 2 Laws mandating separation of the races were not
123. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 228).
124. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003) (citations omitted).
125. See, e.g., Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. 134 (Hen. & M. 1806); Gobu v. Gobu, 1
N.C. 188 (1802).
126. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
127. See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
128. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
129. Similarly, although Cheryl Hopwood argues that Texas Law School would
have put her in the "presumptive admit" category had she been a member of a
preferred minority, it is also true that she would have been a "presumptive admit"
had her application not been downgraded because her undergraduate institution was
insufficiently rigorous. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996).
130. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1074.
131. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2444 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132. As many others have pointed out, a condemnation of caste legislation, not a
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objectionable merely because they utilized a racial classification.
Rather, it was the meaning of those classifications -the driving
sentiment behind laws mandating segregation that "put[] the brand of
servitude and degradation"' 3 3 on black citizens, that rendered them
immoral. No such motivation, neither explicit nor hidden, underlies
policies that seek to enhance diversity by taking account of race.
Their purpose is not to isolate or subordinate anyone, nor do they
impose any kind of stigma on whites. Even under the challenged
diversity policy, Michigan Law School's student body remained
predominately white.
Where the supposedly disfavored race
continues to constitute a large majority of matriculating students, it is
illogical to equate the consciousness of race with the evils of
segregation.
CONCLUSION

As the comparison with utilizing a lottery exposes, arguments
against race-consciousness do not apply universally. Rather, their
force depends heavily on the context of the decision and the way in
which race is taken into account. Comparing race and chance also
helps conceptualize the burden imposed by race-conscious policies.
Far from what the rhetoric suggests, race-conscious policies do not
necessarily deprive whites of fixed entitlements. Instead, their impact
is to alter the odds of success between racial groups. Moreover, in
situations such as higher education admissions, in which white
claimants far outnumber racial minorities, the impact on white
applicants is often quite minimal.
Formal colorblindness ignores these nuances, disregarding the
importance of context and details when judging the fairness of a
particular policy. Instead, colorblindness proponents insist upon
prohibiting race-consciousness in any form, in every situation,
regardless of the role that race plays in the decision-making process.
In doing so, they emphasize the alleged unfairness of altering white
odds of success through race-conscious policies, while ignoring the
ways in which race stacks the odds for each individual from birth.
Although the Supreme Court has stepped back from this extreme
colorblind vision of the Constitution, the doctrinal framework it has
built implicitly privileges claims of colorblindness, by treating race as
uniquely problematic, narrowing the doctrinal focus to block out

formalistic notion of colorblindness, underlies our historical objection to racial
discrimination. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship
and the Constitution (1989); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 1613 to 16-16 (2d ed. 1988); Balkin, supra note 49, at 2313; Fiss, supra note 49, at 107-77;
Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action, Caste, and Cultural Comparison, 97 Mich. L.
Rev. 1311 (1999).
133. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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relevant background inequalities, and imposing a uniform standard of
scrutiny regardless of differing purposes, motives, and effects.
Exploiting the rhetoric of colorblindness, advocates are now
attempting to push their battle against affirmative action one step
further. A new ballot initiative in California seeks to prohibit state
agencies from collecting any information about the race of state
residents in the course of conducting its ordinary operations of hiring,
contracting, licensing, and so on.' The desire to deprive government
agencies of the information necessary to engage in affirmative action
obviously drives this latest initiative. However, the policy implications
of such a proposal extend far beyond affirmative action. If the
government were banned from collecting information about race,
policy makers and researchers would lack information critical for
understanding and addressing racial disparities in school performance,
housing, employment and economic opportunities and health
outcomes. Perhaps the proposal truly is the logical extension of
formal colorblindness, for it represents the vain hope that by blinding
ourselves to the reality of persistent racial inequality, the problem will
simply disappear.

134. See Darryl Fears, California Activist Seeks End to Identification by Race,
Wash. Post, July 5, 2003, at Al; Robert Tomsho, Some Seek Ban on Collection of
Ethnic Data, Wall St. J., June 30, 2003, at B1.
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